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Abstract
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4 standard
provides a wireless mesh network specification on which the ZigBee protocol is based.
ZigBee networks are becoming increasingly popular for use in medical, industrial, and
other applications. By design, ZigBee devices are low-cost and able to form Wireless
Personal Area Networks (WPANs) where low-cost and extended battery life are desirable
features. Traditional security techniques for ZigBee networks are based on presenting
and verifying device bit-level credentials (keys). While historically effective to some
degree, bit-level only security is becoming increasingly insufficient and ZigBee networks
are vulnerable to attack by any unauthorized rogue device that can obtain and present bitlevel credentials for an authorized device.
Previous related research has shown that an additional physical layer (PHY) of
security can be applied to augment ZigBee bit-level security. This additional PHY
security is achieved using Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
fingerprinting. This research focused on utilizing a National Instruments (NI) X310
Software-Defined Radio (SDR) hosting an on-board Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA). The demonstrations included device discrimination assessments using
like-model ZigBee AVR RZUSBstick devices and included generating RF “fingerprints”
in real-time, as an extension to AFIT’s RF-DNA fingerprinting work. The goal was to
develop a fingerprinting process that was both 1) effective at discriminating between likemodel ZigBee devices and 2) efficient for implementation in FPGA hardware.
iv

A comparison was made between 1) fingerprints generated in the traditional
MATLAB environment, and 2) RF-DNA fingerprints generated on the Kintex-7 FPGA
hosted on the NI X310 SDR. RF-DNA discrimination performance using fingerprints
generated in real-time on FPGA hardware consistently exceeded an arbitrary percent
classification benchmark of

.

This was verified across

independent trials using the full-dimensional
Noise Ratio of
reduced sets of

.

feature set at a collected Signal-to-

Fingerprinting performance using dimensionally-

features (a proper subset of

derived from instantaneous Real (

), Imaginary (

full-dimensional features)
), and Amplitude (

)

responses was statistically similar based on 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for all subsets
and averaged
set of

. Fingerprinting performance using a dimensionally reduced
instantaneous Phase (

classification performance of

) features resulted in statistically poorer
.

As designed and implemented, the full-

dimensional FPGA fingerprint generator only utilized approximately 7% of the X310
Kintex-7 FPGA resources. The full-dimensional fingerprinting performance of
using only 7% of FPGA resources demonstrates the feasibility for real-time RFDNA fingerprint generation and like-model ZigBee device discrimination using an SDR
platform.
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REAL-TIME RF-DNA FINGERPRINTING OF ZIGBEE DEVICES
USING A SOFTWARE-DEFINED RADIO WITH FPGA PROCESSING

I. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the operational and technical motivations for conducting
this research. Section 1.2 describes the Operational Motivation for focusing on ZigBee
wireless network applications. Section 1.3 provides the Technical Motivation which is
based on prior Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Radio Frequency Distinct
Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting work, and the relative contributions of this
research. Section 1.4 provides organizational details for this document.

1.2 Operational Motivation
Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) are increasingly popular in personal,
medical, industrial and other applications. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4 standard provides a specification for wireless mesh networks
on which the ZigBee protocol is based. By design, ZigBee devices able to form WPANs
where low-cost and extended battery life are desirable features. Traditional security
techniques for ZigBee networks are predominantly based on presenting and verifying
device bit-level credentials (e.g. keys). While historically effective, ZigBee networks
remain vulnerable to attack by unauthorized rogue devices that can obtain and present
false bit-level credentials matching an authorized device. Even without prior knowledge
of the correct key, replay attacks against inadequately-defended networks can still be
1

employed in which a packet transmitted by an authorized device is collected and later
replayed by an unauthorized device [18].

1.3 Technical Motivation
As shown in Table 1.1 there is a considerable amount of previous related research
[4,12,13,17,20,29,32,33,34] addressing Physical (PHY) layer of security of wireless
communication systems. Some of the methods in these works were adopted and applied
here to address ZigBee PHY-based bit-level security augmentation. The additional PHY
security is achieved using Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
fingerprinting. RF-DNA exploitation involves generating device “fingerprint” from PHY
waveform responses to achieve human-like device discrimination–a unique one-to-one
association between a fingerprint and a device.

The RF-DNA fingerprint used to

discriminate among devices, even when identical bit-level credentials are presented.
While previous AFIT research has demonstrated the effectiveness of MATLAB
simulation-based RF-DNA classification of ZigBee devices [5,20,23], the research here
represents the next step towards achieving real-time device classification and verification.
A complete RF-DNA based security solution for ZigBee devices in the form of an air
monitor is proposed in [23]. The air monitor would be physically co-located with ZigBee
devices and actively accept or reject signals from other ZigBee devices based on their
fingerprint signatures. The purpose of this research was to demonstrate feasibility of
implementing an air monitor using a National Instruments (NI) X310 Software-Defined
Radio (SDR) hosting a Kintex-7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).

2

Table 1.1 provides a summary of technical areas that were previously addressed
and areas addressed in this research. The amount of previous related research listed in
Table 1.1 shows that the efficacy of RF-DNA fingerprinting has been well-established.
The general methodology of the RF-DNA fingerprinting process has remained relatively
unchanged in this research given the success of these previous works.

1.4 Document Organization
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a
basic outline of the ZigBee protocol, SDR implementation, and background on the RFDNA processes employed in this research. Chapter 3 provides the methodology used for
experimental signal collection, FPGA hardware design, classification, three fingerprint
generation methods, device ID verification, and DRA. Chapter 4 presents classification
results for the three fingerprint generation methods, classification performance using
DRA feature sets, device ID verification, rogue rejection and FPGA resource utilization.
Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusions based on research results and
recommendations for future work.

3

Table 1.1: Technical areas in previous related work and current research contributions.
Technical Area
Previous Work
This Work
Addressed
Ref #
TD Features

X

[4,13,17,20,29,32,33,34]

SD Features

X

[27,29,33]

WD Features

X

[12,12]

Computer
FPGA

Fingerprint Generation Platform
[4,10,11,12,13,17,
X
26,27,29,32,33,34]
X

X

X
X

Signal Type
802.11 WiFi

X

[11,12,33]

GSM Cellular

X

[24]

802.16e WiMax

X

[26,27,32,33]

802.15.4 ZigBee

X

[4,20]

X

MDA/ML

X

Classifier Type
[4,10,12,17,20,26,27,29,32,33,34]

X

GRLVQI

X

[4,11,17]

X

GRLVQI
LFS

Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
[4,11,17]
X
X

[10]

4

X

II. Background
This chapter provides the technical background supporting the methodology
described in Chapter 3. Section 2.1 provides details for the ZigBee protocol defined by
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) [9]. Section
2.2 describes the Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprint
generation process which includes calculation of statistical features over a selected
Region Of Interest (ROI) within time-domain signal responses. Section 2.3 describes
model development and device discrimination using the Multiple Discriminant Analysis,
Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifier. This is followed by Section 2.4 which
describes the Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI)
classifier.

Section 2.5 provides a description of Software-Defined Radio (SDR)

implementation and benefits. The chapter concludes with Section 2.6 that describes
attributes of a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and benefits for its use.

2.1 ZigBee Signal Characteristics
ZigBee devices are used to form low-cost, low-power WPANs and support
network-enabled home appliances, home automation, industrial control, medical data
monitoring and other applications. ZigBee devices are designed according to the IEEE
802.15.4 standard [9] which includes provisions supporting several possible modulation
schemes and frequency bands. For this research, the IEEE 802.15.4 frequency band
5

Figure 2.1: Spectral Location of ZigBee Channels Number 11-26 [28].
spanning 2400.0 to 2483.5 MHz was used with 16-ary Offset-Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying (O-QPSK) data modulation. Each channel has an instantaneous RF bandwidth of
, with Ch =5.0 MHz spacing between adjacent channels. Figure 2.1
shows the spectral location and assignment of channels 11-26.
ZigBee transmissions are specified to begin with a preamble region consisting of
8 O-QPSK symbols mapping to 32 binary zeros. Previous research [13] has shown that
this preamble region can be successfully exploited to generate fingerprints and provide
reliable device discrimination using an MDA/ML classifier; this is described in greater
detail in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.

2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
RF-DNA fingerprinting is the process of characterizing the inherent differences in
emission responses collected from multiple devices. These differences are the result of
factors such as operating temperature, device age, and variations in manufacturing
tolerance [25].

Fingerprints can be generated from multiple responses, in multiple

untransformed and transformed domains. Fingerprints in this work were generated using
a two step process: 1) generation of instantaneous Time-Domain (TD) responses, and

6

2) statistical feature generation over the selected TD ROI. Each step is described in detail
below.
2.2.1 Time-Domain Waveform Response
The common TD features used for RF-DNA fingerprint generation are
instantaneous amplitude (a), phase ( ), and frequency (f) responses of a given ROI.
Elements of the corresponding discrete sequences {
calculated from Real (

) and Imaginary (

}, {

, for

(2.1)
,

, and {

(2.2)
(2.3)

.
}, {

} are

) ROI components as follows [2,3,4]:
,

The resultant {

, and {

} sequences are centered (mean removed)

and normalized as follows:
(2.4)

(2.5)

(2.6)
where

,

, and

are corresponding sequence means and “max” represents the

maximum value of the centered sequences {
{

,

and {

,{

} and {

. The resultant

sequences are the centered, normalized TD sequences used

for statistical RF-DNA feature calculation.
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2.2.2 Statistical RF-DNA Features
The centered, normalized sequences from (2.4) through (2.6) are divided into
equal length, contiguous subsequences (ROI subregions) and summarized using

statistical metrics of standard deviation ( ), variance (
that are computed over each of

), skewness ( ) and kurtosis ( )

subregions. Each of the summary statistics is also

computed over the entire ROI, resulting in a total of

regions being used. This

process is illustrated in Figure 2.2.

The summary ,

,

and

statistics are calculated as follows [25]:

(2.7)

(2.8)

(2.9)

(2.10)
where

is total number of samples in a given subsequence and

arbitrary TD response.

represents a an

The summary statistics for a given region

concatenated to form vector

are then

as follows:
(2.11)

where
used to form vector

. The vector

is computed for each of

as,
8

regions, and

Figure 2.2: Representative Illustration of RF-DNA Statistical Fingerprint Generation for
Total Subregions [25].

(2.12)
where

represents one of the TD responses ,

fingerprint vector

or . Finally, the composite statistical

is formed by concatenating the

vector of each TD response as

follows:
(2.13)
The resultant full-dimensional fingerprint vector

from (2.13) contains a total of
elements.

2.3 MDA/ML Classification
MDA/ML device discrimination includes two distinct processes: Multiple
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model development and Maximum Likelihood (ML)
classification. The goal of MDA is to reduce feature dimensionality and provide the
greatest separation between multiple input classes. This is accomplished by projecting
full-dimensional fingerprints into a lower-dimensional space, while 1) maximizing
9

between-class spread and 2) minimizing within-class spread. The between-class ( ) and
within-class (

scatter matrices are computed using [31]:

(2.14)

(2.15)

where
the

and

are the covariance matrix and prior probability, respectively, for each of

input classes. The

-dimensional input RF-DNA fingerprint vectors,

(2.13), are then projected into the

-dimensional space according to
(2.16)

,
where

is the

from

projection matrix formed from the

Eigenvectors of

and is the RF-DNA fingerprint projection into the lower dimensional subspace.
Classification performance depends on the effectiveness of the

matrix in

maximizing between-class distance and minimizing within-class spread. To illustrate the
projection of

using

, two possible MDA projection matrices (

in Figure 2.3 [25]. In this case, projection matrix
model.

10

and

) are shown

provides the “best” classification

Figure 2.3: Representative Projections using
a 2-Dimensional Space [25].

and

Classification of the projected fingerprints

for a

Class Problem into

is performed using a Maximum

Likelihood (ML) process based on Bayesian posterior probability and assuming uniform
costs and equal prior probability. A similarity measure is computed by comparing the
likeness of the unknown

fingerprint to each of

classes. The classification

decision is made by assigning (rightly or wrongly) unknown fingerprint

to the class

yielding the highest measure of similarity.

2.4 GRLVQI Classification
The GRLVQI classifier was also considered to provide a comparison to
MDA/ML. Like MDA/ML, GRLVQI is used to discriminate between multiple classes
but provides several advantages, namely: 1) there is no inherent assumption of the
distribution of input data, 2) GRLVQI is more suitable for cases where input class data
(fingerprints) is noisy or inconsistent, and 3) a relevance ranking is generated for each
11

RF-DNA fingerprint feature [25]. Like prior related research, the GRLVQI relevance
ranking is of particular interest given it provides a means numerically rank features and
enable Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA).
For this research, GRLVQI was implemented as described in [25], with
prototype vectors representing each of the
classified as one of

classes.

An RF-DNA fingerprint is

classes by measuring the Euclidean distance between mapped

fingerprints and each prototype vector; the input fingerprint is assigned to the class whose
prototype vector is the minimum Euclidean distance from the mapped fingerprint. Figure
2.4 displays a visualization of the GRLVQI classification process.

2.5 Software-Defined Radio (SDR)
A Software-Defined Radio (SDR) is a radio system in which components that
have been traditionally implemented with analog hardware, such as mixers or filters, are
replaced with a software-based implementation. SDR technology has quickly gaining
popularity within the last decade given the increased performance in embedded
microprocessors and general-purpose computers which enable implementation of highly
complex radio systems. An SDR can be rapidly reconfigured to change modulation
scheme, bandwidth, and other key parameters that are normally fixed in an analog design.
The SDR functionality can be implemented in a general purpose computer, Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or any combination thereof. Implementations that
only rely on a general purpose computer can have extremely high latency because the
signal has to propagate from the receiver to the computer system, normally through a
Universal Serial Bus (USB) or Ethernet connection. Components implemented on an
12

Figure 2.4: GRLVQI Classification of an Unknown Fingerprint Based on Minimum
Euclidean Distance [25].

FPGA can have very low latency, achieving speeds close to that of an integrated circuit
specifically designed for the task at hand.

2.6 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is a chip that can be programmed to
rearrange its internal logic gates to perform a specific function. For example, an FPGA
can be programmed to process images, implement an encryption algorithm or even to act
as a general purpose microprocessor. An FPGA is typically chosen in an application
where specialized operations are required and where requirements are expected to change
over time. In an SDR system as described in Section 2.5, an FPGA can take the place of
mixers, filters, and more.

These operations that were once performed with fixed

hardware can be rapidly reconfigured in an FPGA implementation. Additionally, the

13

FPGA can be physically located in close proximity to an Analog-to-Digital Converter
(A/D) to minimize overall latency of the radio system.

Because of the increasing

capabilities of modern FPGAs, more SDR functionality can be migrated toward FPGA
implementation and away from general purpose computers.
2.6.1 Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer (CORDIC)
Many communications systems require computation of instantaneous phase as
part of the modulation/demodulation scheme. Instantaneous phase is calculated using an
arctangent operation as shown in (2.2).

There are multiple algorithms available to

implement trigonometric function using an FPGA, Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer
(CORDIC) being one of the most popular. CORDIC is a hardware-efficient algorithm
that only requires addition, subtraction and table lookup operations [2]. The CORDIC
can operate in two modes: vectoring mode and rotation mode. When operating in
rotation mode, the sine and cosine values for a given angle are calculated. This operation
is accomplished by rotating a unit length vector from the x-axis to the given angle with
successively smaller rotations until the given angle is reached. The sine and cosine
values are determined based on the direction of each angular rotation.

Using this

technique, a vector can be converted from a polar to rectangular coordinate system. The
rotation mode of the CORDIC process is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
When operating in vectoring mode, the CORDIC operations described above are
reversed and the magnitude and angle are generated for a given x-y coordinate pair.
Vectoring mode operation results in a conversion from a rectangular to polar coordinate
system.

14

Figure 2.5: Example Operation of CORDIC in Rotation Mode [14].

2.6.2 Cascaded Integrator-Comb (CIC) Filter
In a high-speed SDR system, extracting a narrow-band signal requires downsampling and filtering. For high decimation rates, a long filter with many coefficients is
required for sufficient anti-aliasing filtering. This can become a large bottleneck in the
SDR system, both in terms of latency time and required hardware resources [3].
The Cascaded Integrator-Comb (CIC) filter is a popular filter choice for SDR
systems [16]. The CIC filter operates using only addition and subtraction operations;
there is no multiplication required in the CIC design. This makes the CIC a particularly
attractive option for FPGA-based SDR systems where hardware resources are limited and
multiply operations are especially costly in terms of FPGA resources. Additionally,
unlike most discrete filters the, CIC has a decimator built into its architecture.
A CIC design consists of

“integrator” addition stages followed by the same

number of “comb” subtraction stages. The decimator can be located either at the end of
15

Figure 2.6: Example CIC Design with
Stages [15]. The  Symbols Denote
-1
Modulo-2 Addition, Z Denotes a Delay by One Clock Cycle, and ↓R Denotes DownSampling (Decimation).

all stages or between the integrator and comb stages. An example CIC design is shown
in Figure 2.6. In the case of Figure 2.6, the decimator is located between the integrator
and comb stages.
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III. Methodology
Wireless communication devices are inherently insecure because the transmission
medium can be accessed by unauthorized users. Traditional mechanisms to secure the
communications channel are based on encoding information at the bit level only. These
security mechanisms can be bypassed by forging the required bit-level credentials. This
research aims to characterize a hardware-based security mechanism for protecting
wireless systems from malicious attacks. The proposed solution generates real-time
Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints as described in
Chapter 2.
This chapter describes the methodology used to obtain the experimental results
presented in Chapter 4. The experimental X310 SDR methodology for assessing RFDNA fingerprinting in this research is shown in Figure 3.1.
A simplified fingerprint generation scheme suitable for implementation on a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) was developed.
research was ZigBee emissions.

The signal of interest for this

A MATLAB model was created to validate the

performance of the new prototypical fingerprint generation process. ZigBee beacon
requests (bursts) were experimentally collected on the X310 Software-Defined Radio
(SDR) platform. The collected signals were processed in MATLAB to generate
fingerprints and evaluate Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classification performance.
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X310
Daughterboard
400-4400MHz
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A/D
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I-Q
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Digital
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RF Fingerprint
Generation
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RF Fingerprint
Generation

MATLAB
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Figure 3.1: X310 SDR Methodology for Assessing RF-DNA Fingerprinting Using
Matlab ( ), FPGA-Simulation ( ), and FPGA-Hardware ( ) Generated Fingerprints
[30].

A modular FPGA design was planned and implemented using ModelSim FPGA
simulation tools.

The simulation model was validated using actual ZigBee bursts

collected by the X310 SDR. The use of experimentally collected signals ensured realistic
operation would be recreated as closely as possible. The FPGA simulation-generated
fingerprints

were exported to MATLAB for MDA/ML classification evaluation. The

FPGA design was compiled for use on the X310 SDR Kintex-7 FPGA and uploaded to
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the device. The X310 SDR collected emissions from multiple Zigbee devices and FPGAHardware generated

fingerprints using the embedded FPGA. Hardware generated

fingerprints were transferred to MATLAB and validated using both MDA/ML and
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifiers.
Topics in this chapter are presented sequentially relative to the experimental
methodology overview illustrated in Figure 3.1. Section 3.1 describes the X310 SDR
configuration and setup procedures followed for the collection of radiated bursts. Section
3.2 describes the MATLAB model for FPGA fingerprint generation.

Section 3.3

describes the FPGA fingerprinting implementation. Section 3.4 describes Dimensional
Reduction Analysis (DRA) techniques used in this research. Section 3.5 details the
process of device discrimination using the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers.

3.1 Experimental Signal Collection
3.1.1 X310 SDR Receiver Configuration
The receiver used in this research was a National Instruments (NI) Universal
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) X310 Software-Defined Radio (SDR). The X310
SDR is a commercially available, inexpensive (approximately $5,000) SDR with transmit
and receive capabilities covering DC to 6.0 GHZ depending on daughterboard installed.
For this research, the SBX-40 daughterboard was installed and provided a receive
frequency range of 400-4400 MHz with a maximum instantaneous bandwidth of
. A block diagram of the X310 SDR receiver architecture is shown in Figure
3.2.
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Figure 3.2: X310 SDR Receiver Architecture [6].

The RF emitting devices used in this research included
RZUSBsticks.

AVR

RZUSBstick is a device designed by Atmel Corporation for the

development, debugging and demonstration of IEEE 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, and ZigBee
[1].

The RZUSBstick uses the Universal Serial Bus (USB) for configuration,

transmission and reception of ZigBee data.
The RZUSBstick devices were connected to a computer running the open-source
tool zbstumbler.

Zbstumbler is an application from the killerbee suite, a popular

collection of software tools used to manipulate ZigBee devices [21]. Zbstumbler was
used to configure the devices to broadcast a ZigBee beacon request at a fixed interval
indefinitely. The ZigBee channel used in this research was number NZC = 26 having a
center frequency of

. Channel NZC = 26 was chosen for consistency with
20

Figure 3.3: Normalized Frequency Domain Response of the SBX-40 Daughterboard
Anti-Aliasing Filter (Positive Frequencies Only).

prior related work [20] to help mitigate interference from IEEE 802.11 WiFi. The SBX40 instantaneous bandwidth is

which was sufficient for collecting

ZigBee emissions as described in Section 2.1.

The one-sided

frequency domain response of the SBX-40 anti-aliasing filter is shown in Figure 3.3.
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the bandwidth of the SBX-40 analog anti-aliasing
filter is

. The collected ZigBee emissions were down-converted to

an Intermediate Frequency (IF) using the analog mixer/anti-aliasing filter on the SBX-40.
The complex waveform was sampled at

MS/s by the 14-bit dual channel

Analog to Digital Converter (A/D) on the X310 SDR. The digital complex waveform
was then sent to the FPGA to be digitally down-converted to baseband. The Digital
Down-Conversion (DDC) chain in the FPGA is shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Digital Down-Conversion (DDC) Chain of X310 SDR with Received Signal
Path in Red.

The DDC chain implemented uses a Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer
(CORDIC) based mixer to down-convert the digitized signal to baseband. The CORDIC
algorithm was implemented in rotation mode as described in Chapter 2. A Cascaded
Integrator-Comb filter (CIC) was used to perform low-pass filtering and downsampling
on the complex digital waveform. Unlike other common filters, the CIC has a decimator
built into its architecture, simplifying the downsampling process. The CIC was chosen
for this hardware application given its computational simplicity which only requires
addition and subtraction operations for the CIC filter design. The CIC filter block
diagram is shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: 4-Stage

CIC Filter [15].

“integrator” addition stages followed by

The CIC design consists of
“comb” subtraction stages and an

decimator. The CIC was implemented

as described in [8]. The normalized CIC frequency response is shown in Figure 3.6.
The CIC decimates the
.

signal to a new sample rate of

The sample rate of

is suitable for the previously described

bandwidth of ZigBee channel NZC = 26. The sample rate of
was experimentally deemed sufficient for correct demodulation of ZigBee
emissions. The CIC also performs filtering on the complex waveform. The digital downconversion chain implemented also contains selectable half-band filters for use with
different sample rates, but they are not selected in this research. The baseband signal is
then routed out of the X310 SDR FPGA and to the computer via Ethernet.
3.1.2 X310 SDR Receiver Configuration
All collections were made within a shielded Ramsey STE6000 test enclosure to
ensure a low-noise collection environment for initial proof-of-concept demonstration.
The commercial shielded test enclosure used is shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.6: Normalized Frequency Response of 4-stage

CIC Filter.

Figure 3.7: Ramsey STE6000 Shielded Test Enclosure [19].
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The Ramsey STE6000 was chosen because it was designed for use with
Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band signals such as Bluetooth, WiFi and
ZigBee [19].

The STE6000 provides over 90.0 dB of attenuation at

according to manufacturer specification. Additionally, the interior has an RF absorbent
foam coating that attenuates by

, mitigating multipath interference. The

STE6000 was equipped with Ethernet and USB connections so it can remain closed while
controlling the X310 SDR and ZigBee device, respectively.
The ZigBee Device Under Test (DUT) was connected to the internal USB port of
the STE6000. The X310 SDR was positioned such that its antenna was

from

the DUT. The STE6000 was closed and sealed. The computer was used to configure the
X310 SDR FPGA with the proper firmware. For signal collection, the receiver mode
firmware was flashed onto the FPGA.

For RF-DNA fingerprint generation, the

fingerprint generation mode firmware was flashed onto the FPGA. Zbstumbler software
was initiated to configure the DUT to broadcast ZigBee beacon requests at ZigBee
channel NZC = 26 with a rate of

(bursts per second). The X310 SDR was

then configured to initiate the start of signal collection. Received signals (or generated
fingerprints) were then streamed over Ethernet to the computer where they were saved to
the hard-disk. This process was repeated for all

devices.

3.2 MATLAB Model for FPGA Fingerprint Generation
To demonstrate fingerprint generation in real-time on the FPGA platform, it was
desirable to reduce the computational complexity of previous fingerprint generation
methods. FPGA operations occur in real-time and on synthesized hardware. Certain
25

operations that can be easily calculated with enough time in MATLAB are costly in fixed
hardware resources on an FPGA. For this reason, a reduced-complexity fingerprinting
model was developed with MATLAB as a reduced-complexity subset of the traditional
fingerprinting process.
3.2.1 Burst Detection
Accurate burst detection of the target signal is critical to the RF-DNA process. If
the collected bursts are not properly aligned, the statistical features will cross the region
boundaries, which will degrade process performance process. Therefore, the first step in
the RF-DNA process is the alignment of collected bursts. A burst detection algorithm
was developed that could operate in real-time, with low latency and with low
computational complexity. A squaring-smoothing amplitude detection algorithm was
applied to the real-valued waveform Re of the incoming signal as follows:
(3.1)
The resultant value

is compared to a threshold value . When

start of the burst is indicated as

, the

to collect the transient turn-on region of the

transmitted waveform. Though the Re component was used to detect the burst, similar
results can be obtained using the signal Im component. A representative output of the
smoothing algorithm is shown in Figure 3.8.
The threshold value

was empirically chosen to give consistent burst detection

performance. Knowing the duration of the ZigBee preamble and the starting sample
number, we can select the beginning and end of the ZigBee preamble waveform. The
detected preamble was then extracted from the signal for fingerprint generation.

26

Figure 3.8: Output of Squaring-Smoothing Burst Detection Algorithm.

3.2.2 Fingerprint Generation
The ZigBee waveform preamble is the region of interest (ROI) for ZigBee
fingerprint generation. The preamble duration is standardized to be

per

the IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee specification [9]. At a sample rate of

this

corresponds to a length of

samples. The ROI is further separated into

equal length subregions. Because fingerprints are calculated in real-time on the FPGA,
odd-numbered subregions ([1, 3, 5, 7, 9]) are received and processed during the time of
even numbered subregions ([2, 4, 6, 8, 10]). Therefore, the even numbered subregions
are excluded from the product fingerprint. This process yields a fingerprint comprised of
features based on

subregions. Figure 3.9 shows a ZigBee amplitude response

collected by the X310 SDR with

subregions highlighted.
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Figure 3.9: Experimentally Collected ZigBee Preamble with

The collected amplitude waveform shown in Figure 3.9 is
µs) in length, which is approximately equal to the standard length of

Subregions.

samples (130
from

the IEEE specification. In the simplified MATLAB model, the following time-domain
responses were chosen for fingerprint generation:
1. Real-valued (Re[n]) time domain waveform,
2. Imaginary-valued (Im[n]) time domain waveform,
3. Instantaneous phase ([n]) given by

(3.2)
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4. Instantaneous amplitude (a[n]) given by
(3.3)

.
For each of

subregions of the

,

,

and

waveforms,

the variance (σ2) of each respective waveform was calculated and concatenated to form
fingerprint vector

as follows:
(3.4)

.
Fingerprint vector

was then rounded to 32-bit fixed-point decimal to match

the 32-bit output capability of the X310 SDR.
transmitted by each of

A total of

bursts were

devices and received by the X310 SDR at a sample rate of

. A fingerprint vector

was generated for each burst received, and an

MDA/ML classification model was built and evaluated as described in Chapter 2.

3.3 FPGA Fingerprint Generation
The X310 SDR has a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA which contained the DDC chain as
described in Section 3.1. A fingerprint generator was designed for the Kintex-7 with the
purpose of implementation on the X310 SDR FPGA. The fingerprint generator design
was then simulated with ModelSim FPGA simulation software to generate the FPGASimulation fingerprint vector

. Generation of FPGA-hardware fingerprint vector

was then accomplished by synthesizing the fingerprint generator design within the X310
SDR FPGA.
3.3.1 FPGA Fingerprint Generator Design
The block diagram for the developed FPGA fingerprint generator design is shown
in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Fingerprint Generator Design as Implemented on X310 SDR FPGA.

The design was developed to match MATLAB model functionality as described
in Section 3.2. A CORDIC module was implemented in vectoring mode as described in
Chapter 2. The CORDIC module was used to calculate the instantaneous phase
instantaneous amplitude

from

and

and

. The functional component groups

of the FPGA fingerprinting design are:

1. A squaring-smoothing amplitude-based burst detector as described in Section
3.2.1.
2. A CORDIC module operating in vectoring mode as described in Chapter 2.
3. Variance calculating modules for each of

instantaneous feature

waveforms. Variance calculators were implemented in parallel. Because of
parallel implementation, all

variance values for a given subregion are

calculated simultaneously.
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After calculation of

variance values for the given subregion, results were

sent out of the X310 SDR for concatenation into the full-dimensional fingerprint vector.
3.3.2 Simulated FPGA Fingerprint Generation
To characterize any coloration effects inherent to the FPGA-implemented
fingerprint generator design, a simulation model was desired. The fingerprint design as
described in Section 3.3.1 was implemented in a ModelSim FPGA simulation
environment.

Experimentally collected ZigBee bursts were used as input to the

ModelSim simulated design, and the simulation-generated fingerprints

were collected

and stored for classification performance analysis. This simulation setup is shown in
Figure 3.11.
To build a classification model as described in Chapter 2, a total of
bursts were simulated as collected from each of
fingerprints

.

Simulation-generated

were collected and used for model development results as presented in

Chapter 4.
3.3.3 Hardware FPGA Fingerprint Generation
To characterize the real-time performance of the FPGA-based fingerprint
generator, the fingerprint generator module was inserted at the end of the X310 SDR
DDC chain and instantiated in the actual FPGA hardware. The block diagram for the
resultant X310 SDR hardware chain is shown in Figure 3.12.
As shown in Figure 3.12, the FPGA-based hardware implementation allows for
hardware-generated fingerprints
by the X310 SDR. A total of

to be streamed to the computer as they are received
bursts were collected and processed from each
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Figure 3.11: ModelSim FPGA Simulation Environment for Generation of
SDR Collected ZigBee Bursts.

of

to generate FPGA-Hardware fingerprints

from X310

. The resultant fingerprints were

used to build a model and evaluate classification performance as presented in Chapter 4.

3.4 Feature Set Dimensional Reduction
The complete RF-DNA fingerprint used in this research is based on
subregions with

instantaneous feature waveforms. The length

of a full-

dimensional fingerprint is:
(3.5)
Therefore, a full-dimensional fingerprint of length

was used in this

research. A process known as Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) was performed to
limit the number of features used for model development. The purpose of DRA is to
determine which features can be eliminated while maintaining the desired classification

32

Figure 3.12: X310 SDR Hardware Chain with FPGA-based Fingerprint Generator [6].

performance level.

This research compared two methods of DRA: qualitative and

quantitative.
Qualitative DRA was performed by selecting all features from a particular feature
subset: a-only, ϕ-only, Re-only or Im-only. Each dimensionally reduced feature subset
was used to form

length fingerprints based only on that subset.

Quantivative DRA was performed by selecting only the top-5 most relevant
features as determined by the GRLVQI process. All DRA feature subsets are displayed
in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Dimensionally Reduced Feature Sets used for MDA/ML Classification
DRA Method
Feature Set
Full Dimensional
All
20
Qualitative
a-only
5
Qualitative
ϕ-only
5
Qualitative
Re-only
5
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Qualitative
Quantative

Im-only
GRLVQI Top-5

5
5

3.5 Device Classification
After
and for each of

and

fingerprints were generated from

bursts each,

devices, they were input to the MDA/ML or GRLVQI device

discrimination process. MDA/ML and GRLVQI were performed as described in Chapter
2. The fingerprints were first separated into equal length training and testing fingerprint
sets. Training and testing fingerprint sets were taken as interleaved (odd and even)
subsets of the complete fingerprint set. The training set was then input to the MDA/ML
and GRLVQI classifiers where the classification models were developed. A

-fold

cross-validation process was used by both classifiers to determine the “best” model using
a

value. Once models were developed by both classifiers, the testing set of

fingerprints was used to assess classification performance.

Fingerprints were then

classified in a “Looks most like?” assessment, assigning each testing fingerprint to the
device it was estimated to be. The above steps were repeated for dimensionally reduced
fingerprint vectors. These results are presented in Chapter 4.

3.6 Device ID Verification
While device classification performed a “Looks most like?” comparison, device
ID verification provides a “Looks how much like?” assessment. In the target air monitor
application, verification will be used to reject “rogue” devices that are not authorized
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network access.

This rogue rejection will enhance network security and augment

traditional bit-level security techniques.
Device ID verification was implemented as described in Chapter 2. After model
development, each testing fingerprint was compared to each of
the model was based. The verification test statistics

provides a measure of similarity

between the compared pair of devices. The test statistic
verification threshold value

devices on which

is then compared to a

to make a binary decision of accepting or rejecting the

device’s claimed identity. By comparing only authorized devices to one another and
varying the threshold value

, the relationship between True Verification Rate (TVR)

and False Verification Rate (FVR) was explored. TVR is the percentage of instances
where a device is correctly authorized after claiming its own identity. FVR is the
percentage of instances where a device is authorized after claiming an identity that is not
its own.
An additional case was explored where “rogue” devices were introduced to the
system claiming the identity of authorized devices. The relationship between TVR and
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR) was determined. RAR is the percentage of instances where a
rogue device is incorrectly accepted as an authorized device. Results for TVR vs. FVR
and TVR vs. RAR are presented in Chapter 4.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides results for Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RFDNA) discrimination of ZigBee devices, to include comparison of fingerprinting
performance using MATLAB-generated fingerprints, Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA)-generated fingerprints, and fingerprints generated in a simulated FPGA
environment. Additional results are analyzed, including authorized and rogue device
verification using a Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)
mode. Classification performance is also analyzed using reduced dimensional feature
sets (proper subsets of full dimensional feature sets) as well as FPGA timing and
utilization results.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents Time-Frequency (T-F)
analysis of experimentally collected ZigBee signals that were collected using the X310
Software-Defined Radio (SDR).

Section 4.3 presents classification results of the

MDA/ML model comparing three fingerprint generation methods: 1) simulated-based
MATLAB generated fingerprints (
(

), 2) simulation-based FPGA generated fingerprints

), and 3) hardware-based X310 FPGA-generated fingerprints (

).

Section 4.4

presents authorized and rogue device model verification results. Section 4.5 presents
classification performance results using both qualitative Dimensional Reduction Analysis
(DRA) as well as the quantitative DRA based on feature relevance ranking using a
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) process.
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Finally, Section 4.6 provides timing results for the FPGA hardware design as well as
device capacity utilization.

4.2 Time Frequency (T-F) Analysis
A Time-Frequency (T-F) analysis was conducted to investigate the spectral and
temporal characteristics of experimentally collected ZigBee signals that were collected
using the X310 SDR.

Two types of T-F analysis were performed to validate the

experimental collection setup, including 1) analysis of the X310 SDR internal
background noise and 2) analysis of experimentally collected ZigBee emission
characteristics and comparison with standard specifications.
4.2.1 X310 Background Noise Analysis
The X310 SDR receiver was operated inside a shielded test enclosure without any
other devices present. These collections were used to characterize internal noise to the
X310 SDR. Additionally, this analysis showed the effectiveness of the shielded test
enclosure in attenuating outside radiation. The noise environment was sampled at a
sample rate of

and center frequency of

. These collection

parameters remained constant for all collections and analysis conducted the research.
The resultant normalized Power Spectral Density (PSD) for a one minute X310
background noise collection is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Normalized X310 SDR Background Noise PSD.

As shown in Figure 4.1, the noise environment has a small peak at

= 2.4861

GHz. The results obtained in this research are not affected by the internal noise of the
receiver because it is present equally for all devices.
4.2.2 Collected ZigBee Emission Analysis
Using the collection methodology described in Section 3.3, ZigBee beacon
requests (bursts) were collected with the X310 SDR. The time domain response of an
experimentally collected Zigbee burst is illustrated in Figure 4.2:
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Figure 4.2: Representative X310 SDR Collected ZigBee Burst Amplitude Response
Showing Preamble and Payload Regions.

As described in Section 2.1, the ZigBee preamble consists of 8 Offset Quadrature
Phase Shift Keying (O-QPSK) modulated symbols. Figure 4.3 shows the preamble
response of a typical ZigBee burst, divided into eight symbols. The emissions were
collected near-baseband to enhance the visibility of the information in the figure.
ZigBee device transmissions were initiated by controlling the device with a
computer running the Zbstumbler script.

The zbstumbler script is an open source

application from the killerbee suite [7], a popular collection of software tools used to
manipulate ZigBee devices. The ZigBee devices were configured to broadcast at a
transmission rate of

. The frequency domain response for a

collection is shown in Figure 4.4.

39

Figure 4.3: ZigBee Preamble Response from Fig. 4.2 Showing 8 O-QPSK Symbols.

Figure 4.4: Frequency Response Over Time of
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Baseband ZigBee Bursts.

Although the burst rate was configured to be
transmission was

. A total of

, the actual rate of burst
bursts were collected at sample rate

and down-converted to baseband. The

bursts were then overlaid

and averaged. The normalized Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the resultant waveform
is shown in Figure 4.5.
As described in Section 2.1, the specified bandwidth of a ZigBee channel is
. Therefore, the single-sided baseband bandwidth of a ZigBee channel
is

. There is a 7 dB decrease in power at

. These

results are illustrated in Figure 4.5.

4.3 Classification Model Development
Using the X310 SDR operating in fingerprint generation mode inside a shielded
test enclosure, a total of

ZigBee bursts were collected per device. The

collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio was on the order of
devices. A total of

for all of the

fingerprints were generated by the X310 SDR.

Using MDA, a classification model was developed based on the fingerprints of Atmel
RZUSBstick devices 1, 2 and 3. The model was developed using
fingerprints per device, extracted from a larger pool of

training

total fingerprints, with

full-dimensional fingerprints generated on the FPGA.
A K-fold cross-validation process was used to determine the “best” MDA model
using a

value.

A model was developed that maximized Euclidian distance

between device/class means. That model was used as the projection matrix
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.

Figure 4.5: Normalized PSD of

Projection matrix

Averaged Baseband ZigBee Bursts.

was then multiplied by each of

testing

fingerprints per device to project the fingerprint into a 2-dimensional Fisher space. The
model accuracy was quantified using average percent correct classification (%C) based
on testing fingerprint classification performance for each device, as well as a cross-class
%C for all devices. These results are shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: MDA/ML %C for each Class/Device and the Cross-Class/Device Average
%C at
using
Fingerprints per Class/Device.

In addition to cross-class

as shown in Figure 4.6, the tendency for devices to

be incorrectly classified as each other was also quantified and reflected in the
classification confusion matrix as shown in Table 4.1.
As shown in Table 4.1, all devices achieved an arbitrary benchmark of correct
classification rate

. Additionally, while device 3 achieved

,

devices 1 and 2 “looked like” each other, resulting in some misclassification between the
two devices. New models for

and

devices were created to assess the

performance of the system with additional devices.
confusion matrices for

and

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the

class problems, respectively.
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Input

Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix of

Class Problem at
Classified As
Dev 1 Dev2 Dev 3
Dev 1 98.6% 1.4%
0%
Dev 2 2.2% 97.8% 0%
Dev 3
0%
0%
100%

Input

Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix of

Dev 1
Dev 2
Dev 3
Dev 4

Class Problem at
Classified As
Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev3 Dev 4
98.8% 1.2%
0%
0%
1.8% 98.2%
0%
0%
0%
0.2% 99.6% 0.2%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Input

Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix of

Dev 1
Dev 2
Dev 3
Dev 4
Dev 5

Class Problem at
Classified As
Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev 3 Dev 4 Dev 5
98.6% 1.4%
0%
0%
0%
1.2% 98.8%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
99.8% 0.2%
0%
0%
0%
0.2% 99.8% 0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

.

.

.

4.4 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
Because of the algorithm used by MDA/ML in generating a classification model,
the specific features which give the best classification performance cannot be determined.
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) techniques can be used to identify a selected
subset of features that provides acceptable classification performance.

Dimensional

reduction can be achieved using qualitative methods or quantitative methods. Examples
of qualitatively selected feature subsets include amplitude-only (Amp), phase-only (Phz),
Real-only (Re) and Imaginary-only (Im). A GRLVQI classifier, described in Section 2.4,
was also used to quantitatively select a subset of features based on their respective
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influence on correct device classification. Figure 4.7 shows classification performance
results of an initial trial comparing qualitatively selected features and the top-ranked
quantitatively selected features as selected by GRLVQI. The best performance of
is obtained by using the full-dimensional set of

= 20 features.

Additionally, the FPGA hardware performance was contrasted with the performance of a
simulated FPGA environment. These results are also shown in Figure 4.7.
Additional FPGA hardware trials were performed for a total of
The performance results from

trials.

trials are shown with 95% confidence intervals

(CI) in Figure 4.8. The mean %C for each DRA subset is also shown in Figure 4.8 with
95% confidence intervals omitted because they are within the vertical extent of the
markers.
As shown in Figure 4.8, the full-dimensional
exceeded the arbitrary benchmark of %C = 90% for all
mean results for

fingerprints consistently
trials. Cross-trial

= 5 Amp, Re, and Im are statistically equivalent based on 95% CI.

Finally, performance was poorest for the

= 5 Phz DRA fingerprints which consistently

yielded the lowest %C classification performance.

4.5 Device Verification and Rogue Detection
Device verification allows for a comparison between devices to describe “how
much alike” the devices are. By making this comparison, a relationship can be found
between the True Verification Rate (TVR) and False Verification Rate (FVR). TVR is the
rate at which a device, claiming to be itself, is correctly authorized. FVR is the rate at
which an unauthorized device, claiming to be the authorized device, is incorrectly
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of Qualitative (Phz, Amp, Re, Im) and Quantitative (LVQ) DRA
Performance with Full Dimensional Performance using
,
, and
Generated
Fingerprints. The Number of Features per Feature Set is Indicated in Parenthesis.

Figure 4.8: Average Percent Correct Classification (%C) with 95% Confidence Intervals
for a Total of
Independent Experimental FPGA Hardware Trials. The CrossTrial Mean Shows that Only the Full-Dimensional
Feature Set Achieves the
Arbitrary
Benchmark.
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authorized. By adjusting the threshold at which a device is successfully authorized, the
TVR can be increased; however this could also increase the FVR.
An

class model was developed using the MDA/ML classifier for

fingerprints generated with FPGA hardware. This model used a full-dimensional feature
set of

. The model was trained using

additional

fingerprints per device. An

fingerprints per device were used to compare how much device 1

looks like device 1, device 2 looks like device 2, etc. These results are illustrated in
Figure 4.9. The dashed line in Figure 4.9 represents an arbitrary benchmark of TVR>0.9.
The benchmark of TVR = 0.9 resulted in the corresponding FVR = 0.02 for
devices

and

.

Classification performance for device

is perfect

class model and full-dimensional

feature set,

throughout this trial.
Using the same
devices

and

were introduced as rogue devices. These

additional

devices were individually compared with every authorized device. The Rogue Accept
Rate (RAR) is the rate at which rogue devices, posing as authorized devices, are
incorrectly accepted as the claimed identity. The relationship between TVR and RAR is
shown in Figure 4.10. The dashed black line in Figure 4.10 represents an arbitrary
benchmark of

.

At this benchmark, nearly all cases achieve perfect

classification performance of

and

has imperfect performance of

at
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. Only the “4 looks like 3” case

Figure 4.9: Full-Dimensional (
MDA/ML Model and Signals at

Figure 4.10: Full-Dimensional (
Model and Signals at

) Authorized Device Verification Results for
.

) Rogue Device Rejection Results for MDA/ML
.
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The performance of qualitative DRA for Amp-only, Re-only and Im-only was
statistically equivalent based on 95% CI. The performance of Phz-only was significantly
lower than the other qualitative DRA feature subsets based on 95% CI. Therefore, Amponly was used to generate a computationally light model for device ID verification.
The same verification process described previously was repeated for a reduceddimension
of

feature set containing Amp-only fingerprints. An arbitrary benchmark
and

is used for Authorized Device assessment in Figure 4.11a.

Similarly, an arbitrary benchmark of

and

Rejection assessment in Figure 4.11b. With this reduced-dimension
performance was significantly reduced.
dimensional

is used for Rogue
feature set,

The FPGA implementation of the full-

fingerprint generator consumed only 17% of the total X310 FPGA

resources. Implementing a less computationally complex model is not justified due to the
poor performance results.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 4.11: Authorized device and rogue rejection for Amp-Only DRA feature set for
MDA/ML Model and Signals at
.
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4.6 FPGA Performance
FPGA simulation software was used with the fingerprint generation design to
determine the latency in generating fingerprints from a received ZigBee transmission. A
ZigBee beacon request collected with the X310 in radio mode was input to the FPGA
simulation of the fingerprint generation design so that the exact timing characteristics
could be examined.

Because the FPGA operates synchronously on a fixed clock,

simulated timing performance will exactly match FPGA hardware timing performance.
Figure 4.12 displays the fingerprint generation latency of the X310 FPGA design. Figure
4.12 shows the real-valued waveform of the ZigBee beacon request with the ROI (Region
of Interest) and Payload highlighted. The vertical red line in Figure 4.12 indicates the
point at which fingerprint generation is complete.

As illustrated in Figure 4.12,

fingerprint generation completes before most of the Zigbee payload has been received.
As shown in Figure 4.12, the latency time taken by the FPGA to generate a
complete fingerprint of a single ZigBee beacon request is short in relation to the length of
the payload. Because of the short latency in fingerprint generation time, in future work
the payload could be selectively accepted or rejected based on fingerprinting results in
real time, with no loss in Zigbee receiver data throughput. Figure 4.13 displays this
fingerprint generation latency in greater detail.
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ROI

Payload

Fingerprint Generation Complete

Figure 4.12: Processing Latency of X310 FPGA Real-Time Fingerprint Generation.

Subregion 5
Fprints Done

Subregion 4
Fprints Done

t=7µs

Subregion 3
Fprints Done

Subregion 2
Fprints Done

Subregion 1
Fprints Done

130µs ROI

Figure 4.13: X310 FPGA Fingerprint Generation Processing Latency of
Reception of ROI.
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after

As shown in Figure 4.13, the complete
generated at

after the ROI is received. The

fingerprint is minimal when compared with the

fingerprint is successfully
latency of generating the
duration of the payload.

Assuming a similarly short latency for device classification on FPGA hardware, the
envisioned air monitor could be configured to selectively reject ZigBee transmissions
from unauthorized devices in real-time.
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V. Summary and Conclusions
5.1 Research Summary
ZigBee networks are currently in place for functions such as monitoring medical
devices, relaying electrical usage information to utility companies, and maintaining home
automation systems.

Due to the sensitive nature of many ZigBee applications,

maintaining a high level of security is essential. Traditional security techniques for
ZigBee networks are predominantly based on presenting and verifying device bit-level
credentials (keys). While effective to some degree, bit-level-only security is becoming
increasingly insufficient and ZigBee networks are vulnerable to attack by any
unauthorized rogue device that can obtain and present bit-level credentials for an
authorized device. Even without prior knowledge of the correct key, replay attacks can
still be employed in which a packet transmitted by an authorized device is collected and
later replayed by an unauthorized device [18].
Previous related research in [5,20,23] has shown that an additional Physical layer
(PHY) of security can be applied using Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RFDNA) fingerprinting to augment ZigBee bit-level security.

RF-DNA exploitation

involves generating a uniquely-identifiable “fingerprint” from PHY waveform features
extracted from emissions of a particular device. The RF-DNA fingerprint is then used to
discriminate devices from one another, even when identical (valid or false) bit-level
credentials are presented.

While previous AFIT research has demonstrated the

effectiveness of MATLAB simulation-based RF-DNA classification of ZigBee devices,
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this research provides the next step towards achieving real-time device classification and
verification. A complete RF-DNA based security solution for ZigBee devices in the form
of an air monitor is proposed in [23]. The air monitor would be physically co-located
with ZigBee devices and actively accept or reject signals from other ZigBee devices
based on their fingerprint signatures. The purpose of this research was to demonstrate
feasibility of the air monitor concept using an Ettus Research X310 Software-Defined
Radio (SDR) hosting a Kintex-7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).

5.2 Findings and Contributions
An X310 hardware-based design was developed and evaluated in support of
taking the next step towards achieving reliable air monitoring capability. The design and
demonstration was based on a reduced-complexity MATLAB model of the traditional
RF-DNA fingerprinting process.
The reduced-complexity MATLAB model included extraction of RF-DNA
fingerprint features from ZigBee preamble responses. The preamble was divided into
subregions, over which variance-only statistical features were calculated for the
instantaneous Real (

), Imaginary (

), Phase (

) and Amplitude (

)

time-domain responses. A full-dimensional fingerprint therefore contained a total of
features.
AVR

MATLAB-generated fingerprints (
RZUSBstick

ZigBee

devices

) were created for each of
and

Multiple

Discriminant

Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification performed. The average crossclass accuracy (

) for the initial trial using full-dimensional
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fingerprints exceeded

an arbitrary benchmark of

at a collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio (

)

.
An FPGA-compatible fingerprinting design was developed based on the
MATLAB mode. The FPGA model was simulated using ModelSim simulation software.
Experimentally collected ZigBee waveforms were collected using the X310 SDR which
produced baseband sequence signals (

) that were inputs to the FPGA simulation

to recreate actual operation. The FPGA Simulated (

) fingerprints were created and

classified using the same MDA/ML classifier. In this case, the arbitrary
benchmark was exceeded for an initial trial with

.

The simulated FPGA design was integrated into the X310 FPGA hardware by
instantiating the fingerprint generator following the Digital Down-Conversion (DDC) on
the X310 Kintex-7 FPGA. The FPGA-Hardware (

) fingerprints were generated in

real-time and streamed to the X310 interface computer.
performance was assessed for a total of

MDA/ML classification

independent experimental trials, the

results of which consistently exceeded the arbitrary
Following full-dimensional (

benchmark.

) assessments, Dimensional Reduction

Analysis (DRA) was employed and classification performance evaluated using
dimensionally reduced
fingerprints containing only on
similar performance of
Confidence Intervals (CI) across
containing only

feature sets.
,

Using DRA, it was determined that
, or

features produced statistically

, where statistical equivalence is based on 95%
independent experimental trials. Fingerprints
features produced statistically poorer classification
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performance of

across the

the full-dimensional

independent experimental trials. While

feature set consistently achieved the arbitrary

benchmark, none of the

DRA dimensionally reduced feature sets achieved the

benchmark. As designed and implemented, the full-dimensional fingerprint generator
only utilized 7% of the X310 Kintex-7 FPGA resources. Because of the low amount of
FPGA resources required to implement the full-dimensional fingerprint generator, and
the statistically poorer

performance, the dimensionally reduced

fingerprint

model is not justified in this application.
While the MDA/ML classification provided a “looks most like?” best match
assessment, device ID verification was performed to conduct a “looks how much like?”
assessment using the

authorized devices claiming to be themselves. A Euclidian

distance measure of similarity
value

was calculated and compared to a verification threshold

to make a binary accept-reject decision based on the device’s claimed identity.

By varying threshold

, the relationship between True Verification Rate (TVR) and

False Verification Rate (FVR) was analyzed. TVR is the percentage of instances where a
device is correctly granted network access after claiming its own identity. FVR is the
percentage of instances where a device is incorrectly granted network access after
claiming an identity that is not its own. For the
arbitrary benchmark of
devices.

For

and

full-dimensional feature set, an
was achieved for all authorized

DRA feature sets one of the three devices achieved this benchmark

while all other devices failed.

For final proof-of-concept demonstration, two rogue

devices were introduced and presented claimed IDs matching each of the authorized
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device IDs (a total of 6 rogue assessment scenarios). A comparison of TVR with Rogue
Accept Rate (RAR) was made where RAR is the percentage of instances where a device
is incorrectly granted network access after claiming the identity of an authorized device.
For the full-dimensional case, an arbitrary benchmark of

and

was

achieved for all 6 rogue scenarios.
Implementation of the full-dimensional fingerprint generator required only 7% of
the Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA resources. Therefore, even the mid-level Kintex-7 used in the
X310 has plenty of room for expanding the air monitor’s capability. The implemented
design was able to generate a full-dimensional fingerprint in

after the end of the

ZigBee preamble was detected. This latency is a small fraction of the
payload duration.

ZigBee

Because of the relatively short fingerprint generation latency, an

unauthorized device transmission can easily be rejected by the air monitor in real-time
with no loss in ZigBee data throughput from authorized devices.

5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
This research demonstrates that a low-cost SDR platform with an on-board FPGA is
viable for air monitor implementation. As used here for initial proof-of-concept, the
RZUSBstick ZigBee devices were successfully discriminated using RF-DNA fingerprints
generated on the X310 SDR FPGA.

The results here set the stage for additional

hardware-oriented research avenues, including:
1. Increase RF-DNA Functionality on FPGA: This research is the first step towards
a complete implementation of the air monitor.

FPGA capabilities can be

expanded by implementing additional RF-DNA functionality that was not
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addressed here, including MDA model development and ML classification.
Device ID verification can also be implemented on the FPGA hardware.
2. Consider Alternate Test Statistics: Traditional RF-DNA fingerprint generation
involves generating a myriad of high-dimensional test statistics on a generalpurpose computer having virtually unlimited time and computing resources. In
migrating some of these more promising test statistics to a real-time FPGA
implementation having fixed hardware resources, it will be necessary to consider
which test statistics offer the best performance and which can be implemented
within hardware resource constraints.
3. Perform a Real-Time Demonstration: The culmination of AFIT’s wireless RFDNA

Fingerprinting

research

demonstration of an air monitor.

will

be

successful

implementation

and

This includes demonstrating that bit-level

security can be augmented by PHY RF-DNA fingerprinting to provide enhanced
security in real-time with enhanced speed, efficiency and robustness.
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